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Abstract: 
This paper studies the long-term consequences of the government-sponsored programs of 
European immigration to Southern Brazil before the Great War. We find that the 
municipalities closer to the original sites of nineteenth century government sponsored 
settlements (colônias) have higher per capita income, less poverty and dependence on Bolsa 
Família cash transfers, better health and education outcomes; and for the areas close to 
German colonies, also less inequality of income and educational outcomes than otherwise. 
Since that is a reduced form relationship, we then attempt to identify the relative importance 
of more egalitarian landholdings and higher initial human capital in determining those 
outcomes. Our findings are suggestive that more egalitarian land distribution played a more 
important role than higher initial human capital in achieving the good outcomes associated 
with closeness to a colônia. 
                                                 
1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 3rd "Migration and Development" Conference at the 
Paris School of Economics on September 10 and 11, 2010, with the title “How Bodo Became Brazilian: 
European Migration to Southern Brazil Before World War I.” The original title of this paper is a reference to 
Riegelhaupf and Forman (1970) “Bodo Was Never Brazilian...” about the historical absence of the small holder 
in the Brazilian rural areas. 
2 Irineu de Carvalho Filho is a Senior Economist at the Research Department of the International Monetary 
Fund (e-mail: idecarvalhofilho@imf.org); Leonardo Monasterio is an Economist at IPEA (e-mail: 
leonardo.monasterio@ipea.gov.br). (Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the 
views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the IMF or IMF policy).  
Walter Belluzzo and Rafael G. Duarte helped us to obtain and understand the ENEM test scores data.  We owe 
to Cleandro Krause (IPEA) for the valuable information on the location of the official settlements in the present 
day grid of municípios. We are also grateful to Gabriela Drummond Marques da Silva and Waldery Rodrigues 
Junior for helping us translating the municipal identifiers in the 1970 Census. 
2 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
During Brazil’s first 100 years as an independent country, both government and wealthy 
private citizens struggled to attract immigrants to populate the vast unoccupied lands in the 
subtropical areas in Southern Brazil. Between 1824 and 1918, the Brazilian government 
subsidized the settlement of non-Iberian European immigrants (colonists) in the rural areas of 
that region, in particular to the southernmost province/state of Rio Grande do Sul. In this 
paper, we contribute to the literature on the relationship between immigration and 
development by identifying the long-term consequences of Brazil’s government sponsored 
programs for settlement of European immigrants. 
 
It has long been argued that the local economies and societies that emerged from those 
colonization programs were different in many dimensions from those in other parts of Brazil: 
the areas of government-sponsored settlement (official colonies) colonies had more equitable 
land distribution, received larger transfers from the central government, and the colonists in 
general had a higher level of human capital than the typical backlander Brazilian (usually 
referred as the caboclo).3 Almost two hundred years after the first group of German 
immigrants settled in Colônia São Leopoldo in 1824, the state of Rio Grande do Sul 
(henceforth, RS) is one of the most prosperous in the Brazilian federation and one of the 
most developed areas in Latin America. While its per capita income has fluctuated in a range 
between 13 and 46 percent higher than the Brazilian average4 for the recent period for which 
a consistent series of annual state GDP series is available (from 1985 to 2007), in many 
welfare indicators (e.g. life expectancy) it holds the lead amongst all Brazil states (PNUD, 
2003). Moreover, within the state of Rio Grande do Sul (exclusive of the state capital), there 
is a 19 percent gap in log relative incomes between the counties (municípios) that were sites 
of government sponsored colonies and the ones that were not, or a gap of 7¼ percentage 
points after we control for population size (in a linear regression). The relative success of 
those local economies holds clues to understanding the process of economic development, 
the factors that have held back other parts of Brazil and the developing world, and the long-
term consequences of immigration.  
 
In this paper, we contrast the experience of counties (municípios) where official colonies 
were installed with those without them; and whether there were differences between the 
colonies populated by Germans, Italians and other Europeans (mostly Poles, Austrians, 
Frenchmen and Russians). We identified and located 49 official settlements (colônias) in that 
state, established between 1824 and 1918, of which some bore fruit and laid the ground work 
for prosperous middle sized towns, while others failed miserably, surviving only in the 
                                                 
3 Age-heaping patterns suggest that the 19th century immigrants have better numeracy skills than those of their 
contemporaneous native Brazilians (Stolz, Baten and Botelho 2010). 
4 In 2009, Brazil’s GDP per capita was about US$10,500 (PPP in current dollars, source: IMF/WEO). 
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historical records (for details on our database of colonies, see the appendix). Of those official 
colonies, 18 were settled exclusively by German colonists, 21 by a combination of colonists 
of German and other nationalities; and 10 without the German element.  
 
While the settlers in the areas around the official colonies had to live under the Brazilian laws 
and institutions, their success or failure relative to other areas and the differences among 
different colonies inform us about the importance of the features that made them different. 
First, the government sponsorship may have given an initial advantage that set in motion 
cumulative processes, perhaps related to agglomeration economies, which made those 
locations more productive even in the long-run. Second, colonists may have started off with 
more human capital and been more exposed to the idea of public instruction and formal 
education than other peoples in 19th century Brazil. The evidence on age heaping patterns 
implies immigrants had better numeracy skills than native Brazilians (Stolz, Baten and 
Botelho, 2010). Enrollment rates of children age 5-14 were more than 70 percent in Germany 
as early as the 1860s (as early as the 1830s for Prussia for which earlier data is available); 
about 30 percent in Italy in 1870 when the first Italian colonies were settled in RS (Lindert 
2004, pp. 91-93). The same source has enrollment rates of 10 percent for Brazil in 1900.6 
Third, the land grants may have generated a more equitable distribution of land property or a 
different agrarian structure more conducive to development than the one found in other parts 
of the country. Data from the Census of 1920 shows a marked difference in land 
concentration between municipalities with official colonies and those without. The 
(unweighted) average land gini for the 30 municipalities with official colonies was 0.57 (and 
as low was 0.25 in the municipality of São Leopoldo, the first German colony); and 0.67 for 
the 41 municipalities without an official colony. Finally, colonists may have brought to 
Brazil different civic traditions (Putnam, 1993, Knack and Keefer, 1997), culture (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales, 2006), or preferences or opinions about the importance of a formal 
education (Kreutz 2000).  
 
This study relates to the literature attempting to identify the long-term, slow-moving 
determinants of economic and social outcomes, and how they are shaped by endogenous 
processes and historical accidents (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson 2001, 2002; Nunn 2007; Banerjee and Iyer 2010). It also relates to a growing 
literature on the historical determinants of local institutions and economic performance in 
Brazil. Naritomi, Soares and Assunção (2007) study the colonial origins of institutions in 
Brazil looking back to the sugar-cane and gold cycles of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
                                                 
6 Easterly and Levine (2009) argue in favor of an important role for human capital in long-term development of 
former colonies. De Carvalho Filho and Colistete (2010) find that in the state of São Paulo, immigrant farm-
laborers from countries where public schooling was already established may have played an important role in 
the early development of locally-funded public instruction, with long-lasting consequences for human capital 
and income levels. 
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centuries. Martínez-Fritscher, Musacchio and Viarengo (2010) study the political economy of 
education in Brazil during the period of increased decentralization of revenues after the 
proclamation of the Republic. De Carvalho Filho and Colistete (2010) study the connections 
between the coffee cycle, European immigration of farm laborers and the establishment of 
public instruction institutions in the state of São Paulo. Rocha et al (2010) also analyzed the 
case of the colonies in São Paulo and found evidence suggesting the role of human capital of 
immigrants in the long term development of such areas. 
 
We will proceed as follows. In the next section, we will introduce the history behind the 
official settlements in RS; in section II, we present the data underlying our empirical work; in 
section III, we discuss our empirical strategy and reduced form results relating a wide array 
of outcomes to proximity to an official colony; in section IV, we attempt to disentangle the 
roles played by two distinctive characteristics of official colonies: a more egalitarian land 
distribution; and greater human capital of the immigrants. Finally in section V we conclude. 
 
 
II.   THE HISTORY BEHIND THE OFFICIAL SETTLEMENTS IN THE RIO GRANDE DO SUL 
Twenty or thirty years ago, the life of a German labouring man was not what it now 
is, or is fast becoming. Small states had stern laws, and, in the larger ones, 
multitudinous restrictions gave little room for free expansion. Trade, throttled in its 
medieval swathing-clothes, was often dull, prices and wages low, manufactures, in 
some states, in something like to infancy; thereto came political dissensions, military 
service, bad harvests, with hunger-typhus in the rear; so that a poor man might ell 
come, and that not seldom, to feel pinched. Thus the devil drove; the desire of those 
who ruled the councils of Brazil to replenish their land opened a way. After the 
formal denunciation, followed, about 1850, by the practical suppression of the slave 
trade, this dilettante desire became an imperative necessity; hence forward agents 
were constantly at hand in Europe, with all their paraphernalia of puffs, placards, 
and pamphlets, to assist the harassed German in his attempt to escape a bitter 
present, to allure him with sunny pictures of the future. 
 
In sooth it was a real case of needs must, and the two necessities played perfectly into 
each other. Ship after ship disembarked its human cargo, colony followed colony into 
the bowers of the Eldorado. 
 
(Jacaré-Assú, 1873) 
 
A.   History 
In 1808, the province of São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul (later to become the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul, with the promulgation of the Republic in 1889) was inhabited by 87,000 
people spread in a territory with an area similar to modern day Italy. In 1830, its population 
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had doubled, and by 1872 it had reached 446,000 people. Behind this fast population growth 
were active policies by the Portuguese and later Brazilian Imperial court and later Republican 
government to foster the occupation of those nearly empty lands.  
 
First, the province had strategic importance due to its location in the border between the 
original Portuguese and Spanish dominions in the Southern Cone (Figure 1). This is 
highlighted by its recurrent history as a site of military clashes and skirmishes before and 
after Brazil and its neighboring countries became independent, as well as a history of long 
and bloody internal conflicts.8 Second, there was an economic rationale for immigration as 
RS shared the low labor/land density characteristic of most other parts of nineteenth century 
Brazil.9 Last but not the least, government-sponsored European migration may have reflected 
widespread racist views (Andrews 1988) or the Teutonic sympathies by Emperor Pedro II, 
himself a fluent German speaker and son of a Viennese princess. 
 
The first official colony in Rio Grande do Sul was established only two years after the 
Brazilian independence, in 1824, when a first batch of 126 German immigrants settled in the 
old Royal flax factory in the newly established colony of São Leopoldo in the valley of the 
Rio Sinos, some fifty miles from the provincial capital of Porto Alegre (for our list of 
government sponsored colonies in Rio Grande do Sul, see Table 1). In the first experiments 
with official settlements, immigrants were promised generous support: free transport from a 
European port to the colony, 77 hectares of land for each family, livestock and cash support 
for one year (Roche 1969, p.95). The combination of push factors in the origination countries 
and the rich incentives generated a remarkable flow. Before the Farroupilha Revolution 
(1835-1845) interrupted immigration for ten years, 4856 colonists had arrived to the São 
Leopoldo colony alone.11 And over the years after the resolution of the Farroupilha 
Revolution through the World War I, Rio Grande do Sul became one of the major immigrant 
receiving areas in Brazil. Table 2 shows the proportion of foreigners in Rio Grande do Sul 
and Brazil for 1872 through the present – in 1900, the foreigners accounted for 12% of the 
population of that state and about 6% of Brazilian population. 
                                                 
8 During the 19th century, modern-day Uruguay was invaded twice (1811-12 and 1816-18), and the Cisplatina 
War (1825-28), the River Plate War (1851-52), and the Paraguay War (1864-1870) were fought. Internal 
conflicts were not less frequent or deadly. The Farroupilha Revolution (1835-1845), a separatist insurrection, 
caused thousands of deaths and split the province for a decade. In the first years after the proclamation of the 
Republic, violent conflict again erupted with the Federalist Revolution (1893-1895) as groups jockeyed for 
greater state autonomy. 
9 Holloway (1974) studies the problem of lack of arms in the coffee plantations of Southeast Brazil; for a 
contemporaneous account, see Grossi (1905). 
11 To bring some perspective, total immigration to Brazil between 1820 and 1929 was 4.5 million while the 
United States received during the same period 37.5 millions. In terms of ethnic composition, Germans 
accounted for 205,000 immigrants, less than 5 percent of total migration to Brazil, but almost 6 million or more 
than 15 percent of the total to the United States (Luebke 1990). 
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Between 1824 and 1848, official settlement was financed by the Empire and coordinated 
erratically. After the end of the Farroupilha Revolution, the provincial government started to 
take part in the settlement project and there was a gradual reduction in the incentives. In 
1851, provincial legislation established that land grants would be reduced to 48 ha lots; in 
1854, incentives were further weakened by legislation determining that lots would not be  
granted anymore, but sold to the settlers with subsidized credit, while the transportation from 
the port of Rio Grande to the colônia remained free (Roche 1969, p.102).  
 
For the first 50 years since the establishment of Colônia São Leopoldo, each one of the 
official settlements was occupied by German colonists. The first official colony with non-
Germans was only established in 1870 in present-day Bento Gonçalves with Italians, 
Austrians and Frenchmen. From that date on, the flow of Italian settlers came to outnumber 
that of German settlers, and other Europeans (mostly Poles, but also Frenchmen and 
Austrians) started to become more common (Korndörfer 2009). 
 
The typical German agricultural settlement in southern Brazil was organized around a 
Schneiss or Pikade (picada in Portuguese). That is a long, straight cut through the virgin 
forest along which individual settlers would receive long, narrow plots of land of one to two 
hundred acres at right angles of the road (James 1940; Luebke 1990). The typical colony 
settlers would have to spend the first one or two years clearing the land before they could 
farm it (thus the need for a government stipend). Many those farmers soon adopted the native 
agricultural technique of slash and burn and planting of indigenous crops such as manioc and 
maize (James 1940; Waibel 1950; Luebke 1990).  
 
In the Republican period, starting in 1889, there was a diversification of the sources of 
migrants beyond the traditional source countries of Germany and Italy. As a matter of 
rhetoric, the state government advocated spontaneous voluntary migration, but its deeds 
heavily subsidized immigration. The state government would generally pay for the trip from 
the European port to the final destination (Roche 1969, p. 122). In 1865, Brazilian consulates 
in Europe would offer to cover the additional maritime transport cost to Brazil to attract 
immigrants that otherwise would have gone to the United States (Roche 1969, p. 101).12 
Subsidies to other services such as hostelling, feeding the settlers while in transit and 
financing the acquisition of seeds were introduced and phased out every few years probably 
highlighting a combination of some hesitancy by policymakers and the vagaries of the budget 
process (Roche 1969, p. 123). The legal and de facto instability of the system of subsidies 
may have played a role in limiting the flow of migrants to RS to a fraction of the contingents 
                                                 
12 Timmer and Williamson (1996, 1998) construct an index of immigration policy with the goal of measuring 
immigration policy stance, covering the period from 1860 to 1930, which highlights a very favorable policy 
stance in Brazil from the 1890s to World War I. 
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that flowed to Argentina or the United States, but other factors were at play – 
contemporaneous observers seemed to agree about Brazil’s lack of attractiveness relative to 
the United States (Jacaré-Assu 1873) and immigration to Brazil was actively opposed by 
some European governments on the grounds of alleged previous poor treatment to 
immigrants (e.g. Grossi 1905; Holloway 1980, pp.37). 
 
B.   Exogenous variation in the location of official colonies 
What were the criteria to determine where official colonies would be located? According to 
Roche (1969 p. 112), the European settlements were expected to be “seeds” of development, 
examples of prosperity to the locals. So, in the less populated areas, the expectation was that 
scattered agricultural nuclei would attract the settlement of Brazilians. Rio Grande do Sul can 
be subdivided into four geographical regions: the Campanha (Prairie), the Planalto (Plateau), 
the Serra (Mountain) and the Littoral and atypical areas - Figure 2 shows the main regions of 
Rio Grande do Sul (Fonseca, 1983). The first settlements were established in the Serra region 
and were located in forested areas (Amstad 1999). Many of those settlements were created in 
the lower parts of the Serra as an entrepôt for the occupation of the region of the Plateau and 
to connect preexisting urban centers. There were also settlements which Roche (1969 p.177) 
calls islands, that were established in isolated areas as beachheads to occupy a surrounding 
region. Table 3 lists the distribution of official settlements according to the regional 
classification. With the exception of the Campanha region, which was mostly settled by 
extensive cattle ranching before the 19th century and received only 3 official colonies, official 
colonies appear to be distributed uniformly on the map of Rio Grande do Sul. The 
historiography also posits that while some colonies were located in areas of easy 
transportation cost, others were established in less favorable settings.13  
 
The identifying assumption in our empirical analysis is that once one controls for a host of 
time-invariant characteristics (maximum temperature, temperature range, soil quality, 
altitude, rain patterns and distance to the capital for each municipality), we can treat the 
assignment of colonies to municipalities as random.  
 
It is also the case that immigrants were not required to stay in the official colonies and they 
and their offspring often migrated. Roche (1954, 1969) analyzed this phenomenon and 
pointed to the depletion of land productivity and the parceling out of plots among heirs.15 In 
                                                 
13 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that the settlements were not located in the best possible settings. Amstad 
(1924  p. 87) tells that migrants to the Santo Ângelo colony (created in 1855) were taken by boat to the vicinity 
of the site of the colony. Upon disembarking, they felt disappointed with the quality of the land and decided to 
return. To their surprise, the boat had departed leaving behind their belongings. Hence they settled there. 
15 For some authors, this loss of productivity was inherent to the system of cultivation based on ‘land rotation’ – 
instead of crop rotation combined with stock raising, e.g. Waibel (1950). 
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search of new land, the offspring of the first settlers moved first to the west of the state and 
later to the Plateau. Hence while some characteristics of official colonies do not migrate with 
the colonists (e.g. land ownership concentration), human and social capital features were 
portable and followed the immigrants and their offspring where they relocated. 
 
III.   DATA 
The sources for locating the colonies are the publications by Mulhall (1873), Amstad (1924), 
Roche (1969), Iotti (2001) and Korndörfer (2009). The first author was a contemporaneous 
observer; the works by Amstad and Roche provide an extensive list of names of the official 
settlements and their municipalities at their inception; Iotti (2001) is a compilation of laws 
and regulations on immigration and colonization from mid 18th century to the beginning of 
the Great War; and Korndörfer (2009) is a database developed with the help of researchers 
interested in genealogy and provides further information about the ethnic composition of 
each colony. 
 
The matching of official colonies to meaningful political units was a challenge. In 1872, the 
first year of a reliable census in Brazil, there were only 33 municipalities in RS; in 2007, 
there were 496. Some of the official colonies blossomed and originated their own 
municipalities; others failed and their colonists dispersed. From a total of 52 official colonies, 
we could identify their present day municipality and ethnic composition of colonists for all 
but 3. The list of official colonies, with their establishment dates, current municipalities and 
ethnic composition is in Table 1. 
 
IV.   EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND REDUCED FORM RESULTS 
To begin with, we construct for each municipality, measures of closeness to an official (or 
German, Italian or other European official) colony, given by the function closei: 
 
  | 1exp min ,  if 0
1 if 1
A
j
A
iA j I
i
A
i
i j I
close
I
     
 
 
where the function ,i j  denotes the distance in miles between the centers of the 
municipalities i  and j ; AjI is an indicator function equal to 1 if municipality j was the site of 
a colony of type A; and is a spatial discount factor, similar to a non-parametric kernel. For 
instance, the municipality of São Leopoldo, site of the first official German colony, has 
Germanclose = Anyclose = 1, but 0.19Italianclose  and 0.17Italianclose   when the parameter  is 
set equal to 1/25 (See Figures 4-5 for the geographical distribution of the municipalities with 
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official colonies and the values of the closeness function for  = 1/25).17 The results in this 
paper were obtained using equal to 1/25 but qualitative similar results could be obtained 
for a range of different choices of the spatial discount factor.18 
 
The building block of our analysis is a simple linear econometric model relating an outcome 
of our interest Y to closeness to an official colony and a set of exogenous time-invariant 
controls, using data at the local level: 
 
        Y closeness Z u     (1) 
 
where Y  is the outcome of interest; closeness stand for measures of closeness to an official 
colony; Z includes time-invariant controls (such as soil quality, rain and temperature patterns, 
altitude and distance from the state capital) and u is an error orthogonal to closeness variables 
and Z.  That is the regression specification reported in column (1) of Table 4. 19  
 
We also compare the results of regression (1) above with a specification where we introduce 
additional controls (population, population density, per capita income levels) to examine 
whether the association between official colonies and the variables of interest are robust 
(results reported in column 2 of Table 4).  
 
Finally, we estimate a regression where we differentiate between closeness to German, 
Italian and other European colonies (results reported in column 3 of Table 4): 
 
 1 2 3            Y closeGerman closeItalian closeOther Z u         (1a) 
 
A.   Does the location of official colonies matter for the present day distribution of 
cultural and ethnical attributes? 
The premise behind this paper is that the location of colonies of immigrants from different 
ethnic or cultural backgrounds matters for the present day distribution of ethnic or national 
origin groups in Rio Grande do Sul. That is not a moot question because colonists were very 
                                                 
17  When is set to infinity, the function closeness equals to an indicator function for the municipalities with 
official colonies. 
18 In the Appendix we provide a table presenting a summary of results for different values of  
19 Notice that those results rely on the assumption that the original location of official settlements and ethnic 
distribution of immigrants was exogenous to the outcomes of interest, conditional on the vector of natural 
characteristics Z. 
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mobile, their fertility rate was very high, and their offspring often left their original plots 
behind to settle somewhere else in the agricultural frontier.20 
 
To measure the persistence of the cultural and ethnical composition of the areas nearby 
official colonies, the ideal would be to use some direct measure of ethnic heritage (such as in 
the U.S. Census). However, the Brazilian census does not collect information on ethnic 
heritage, so we have to take the shortcut of proxying ethnic heritage through religion 
affiliation. There are sharp differences in religion between the two major ethnic groups of 
colonists: while Germans were either Catholic or Protestant, Italian settlers were in almost 
totality Catholic. Since the original populations of RS were in almost totality Catholic, one 
would expect that persistence of cultural and ethnical composition would manifest through a 
higher prevalence of mainline Protestantism in the areas around German colonies, but not in 
the areas around Italian ones and away from any colonies. 
 
The results are promising. We find no evidence that closeness to a generic colony increases 
the proportion of Catholics (Table 4, row 1, columns 1-2), but we find that a significant 
negative (positive) effect of closeness to a German (Italian) colony on the prevalence of 
Catholicism, as one would expect if the prevalent religion among the 19th and early 20th 
century immigrants when the colonies were established still persisted nowadays. In 
quantitative terms, a municipality that hosted a German colony has about 10 percent less 
Catholics than one away from any such colony; on the other hand, presence of an Italian 
colony increases the proportion of Catholics by almost 20 percentage points. We could not 
find evidence of difference between “other Europeans” and German colonies. 
 
The effect on prevalence of mainline Protestants (defined as Lutherans, Presbyterians, 
Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, Evangelicals, Adventists, Anglicans and 
Mennonites) confirms the general pattern. Since Protestants typically settled in Rio Grande 
do Sul in official colonies, we find a marginally significant positive association of closeness 
to any colony on the proportion of Protestants; but a strongly significant one for German 
colonies, while closeness to Italian colonies is negatively correlated with Protestantism (row 
2). Moreover, the effects of closeness to a German colony on prevalence of Protestantism are 
statistically different from Italian and other European colonies. 
 
Thus we have established that while European migrants to Rio Grande do Sul were 
undeniably footloose and their offspring dispersed in the agricultural frontier, the colonists 
left their footprints behind: the closer a municipality is from an official colony settled by 
Germans during the hundred years before the First World War, the greater the prevalence of 
mainline Protestantism today. 
 
                                                 
20 Roche (1954) documents the rural-to-rural migration among settlers in RS. 
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B.   Effects of official colonies on present-day macroeconomic variables 
Proximity to a colony site is correlated with population density in 2000 (row 4), the more so 
for German colonies. This indicates that colonies actually played the role of seeds for 
regional economic development (Roche 1969). We also find a stronger effect of closeness to 
a German colony, which we may attribute to German colonies being on average older than 
non-German ones or to differences in long-term development. 
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is also higher nearby official colonies (row 5). The 
magnitude of the effect is such that if that if the Brazilian average HDI (78th in the 2009 
UNDP rank) increased by the magnitude of the effect on HDI of maximum closeness to a 
colony, it would climb 9 positions in the HDI ranking of countries. The effect of the colonies 
on the HDI index vanishes once we control for population, population density and per capita 
income, but that is likely due to the direct effect of per capita income on the HDI. We also 
find a stronger effect of proximity to colonies with non-Germans, non-Italians relative to 
proximity to German or Italian colonies. 
 
Per capita income is significantly higher nearby official colonies (row 6). Municipalities 
that were the site of colonies are 19 percent richer than those away from a colony. This effect 
is significantly stronger for the sites of colonies with non-German, non-Italian colonists (as in 
the effect on HDI). In line with the findings on per capita income, poverty rates (row 7) are 
also lower the closer a municipality is from an official colony – while the average 
unweighted municipal poverty rate is 26 percent, sites of colonies have poverty rates almost 
10 percentage points lower than municipalities away from official colonies. 
 
The lower poverty rate in the neighborhood of colonies, however, is not only due to higher 
income levels, but a more equitable income distribution plays a role (row 8). While the 
average unweighted municipal Gini index is 0.52, the colony effect reduces the Gini by 0.032 
(column 1). Interestingly, even after we add ‘endogenous controls’ such as per capita income 
and population density, we still find an effect of colonies on income distribution, suggesting 
that causality may directly stem from the presence of immigrant colonies. 
 
In summary, the areas closer to official colonies have higher per capita income, more dense 
population and less poverty than other areas of the state. Moreover, the evidence points to a 
direct effect from the existence of a colony to a more equitable income distribution in the 
present. 
 
C.   Effects on health, education and other social indicators 
Effects on health outcomes and inputs are reported in rows 9-12. Closeness to a colony has 
a significant effect reducing child mortality, increasing life expectancy and increasing the 
availability of physicians (column 1) – but no effect on the proportion of nurses with a higher 
degree, which is an alternative indicator of quality of health providers. However, the effects 
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on child mortality and life expectancy are not robust to including controls for population, 
population density and income, which suggests that those variables may be the proximate 
causes of the better health indicators (while not denying the possibility that population, 
population density and income levels are themselves influenced by proximity to a colony). 
As regards differences between colonies across ethnic origins, we could find no significant 
difference. 
 
The effects on education are also strongly significant and favorable to the areas close to 
colonies (rows 13-18). Closeness to an official colony is negatively correlated to illiteracy 
rates for persons older than 15 years (the average illiteracy rate is over 9 percent in the 
sample). This effect is robust to inclusion of controls for population, population density, and 
per capita income. When assessing separately the effects of colonies of different origins, we 
find a marginally significant difference between German and Italian colonies, whereas the 
former is associated with 4½ percentage points lower illiteracy rates than the latter. 
 
The effect on high school test scores (ENEM) shows a large significant effect of closeness 
to an official colony (row 14).21 While the (unweighted) standard deviation of average scores 
by municipality is 0.07, the effect of a colony site is 0.057 without controls for population, 
population density and income, and 0.036 when those controls are added. When separating 
the effects by origin of colonists, closeness to German colonies is associated with 
significantly better test scores than the non-German colonies. 
 
We next examine whether there is any effect on the intra-municipality dispersion of test 
scores. If one of the distinguishing consequences of official colonies is to bequeath a more 
equitable society, one would expect a smaller dispersion of test scores, just as well as we 
found smaller income Gini coefficients around the colonies. The results are reported in row 
15, which shows a negative but not statistically significant effect of closeness to a colony on 
the dispersion of scores. Looking into the breakdown of colonies by national origins, we find 
a smaller dispersion of test scores in the municipalities closer to a German colony. 
 
We then look at two measures of school enrollment we built from the microdata of the 
Brazilian Census of 2000: the net enrollment rate ages 10-14 and the private school 
enrollment ages 7-17 (rows 16-17). The choice of the age range for the net enrollment rate 
follows the literature on child labor and school enrollment in Brazil (the minimum legal age 
for working in Brazil is 14). We find no effect on 10-14 enrollment rates for colonies in 
general, but a small positive effect from Italian colonies.  
 
                                                 
21 ENEM is a nationwide exam for concluding high school students with a very high take-up rate. To construct 
mean scores, we run a regression of individual Z-scores on interactions of age, gender and latest degree 
concluded; save the residuals; and aggregate them by municipality or minimal comparable area. 
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As regards enrollment in private schools, our prior is that the ethnic homogeneity and 
isolation that characterized some of the official colonies would generate a fertile ground for 
private institutions of learning that would preserve the colonists’ cultural or religious 
heritages. To our surprise, although we find a relatively large effect of closeness to colonies, 
this effect all but vanishes once controls for population, population density and income are 
included in the regression, which suggests that while children living close to colonies are 
more likely to attend a private school, that might be related to them being richer or living in a 
more densely populated municipality. 
 
The findings of lower illiteracy rates, higher average and lower dispersion of test scores in 
the areas around German colonies may be explained as a long-term effect of early 
introduction of rural primary instruction and a higher initial human capital in the nineteenth 
century. Since the early years of immigration, European immigrants demanded public 
instruction (Kreutz 2000, pp. 161). Even when the government did not provide it, they often 
organized community schools along confessional lines. Among all immigrant groups, the 
importance of community school was more salient for German-Brazilians, who organized a 
network of rural schools to maintain their links with Deutschtum and Gospel (Willems 1955), 
and even to this day some of the towns with the highest education indicators in Brazil were 
originally sites of German settlements – 33 of the 50 municipalities with the highest literacy 
rates in 1991 were located in RS (Kreutz 2000, 2005).23 
 
The proportion of Bolsa Família recipients is both a measure of dependence from federal 
government transfers and also incidence of poverty – the Bolsa Família is a means tested 
cash transfer aimed at poor families with children.24 As one would expect considering the 
higher income and lower inequality in the surroundings of the official colonies, there is a 
significant negative effect of closeness to colonies on the incidence of Bolsa Família (row 
18). This effect is about 1/3 of the baseline average.  
 
Finally, one of the most important policy problems in Brazil are high levels of violence, not 
only in the large urban centers, but also more recently even in small and medium-sized 
towns, such as most of the municipalities in our sample. We find a negative but insignificant 
effect of proximity to colonies on homicide rates. 
 
                                                 
23 In a study of the early years of public instruction in the state of São Paulo, de Carvalho Filho and Colistete 
(2010) found a positive relationship between the proportion of farm hands that were foreign-born and locally-
financed educational expenditures in the first decade of the twentieth century; and that those variables are also 
correlated with test scores today. Bezerra (2001) studies the history of a German rural school in the state of São 
Paulo.  
24 For details of Bolsa Família, see Hall (2006). 
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In summary, closeness to an official colony is associated with better health indicators, 
illiteracy and educational outcomes, perhaps in large part because the areas close to colonies 
have greater population density and are richer than elsewhere in the state. They are also less 
dependent on transfers to families from the federal government and may have lower 
homicide rates. Finally, German colonies are associated with higher mean and lower 
dispersion of high school test scores. 
 
D.   Effects on local fiscal policy 
We have found that closeness to official colonies is associated with some better educational 
outcomes. We now explore whether this might reflect different patterns of municipal 
expenditure (in Brazil, municipalities are usually responsible for elementary education, 
while secondary education falls under the wings of the state government). In rows 20-22 we 
report the results for per capita education expenditures, the share of the municipal budget 
dedicated to education and the share of the municipal budget allocated to overhead costs (a 
proxy for waste or inefficiency). Our results show no evidence that the municipalities close 
to official colonies have different expenditure patterns.  
 
E.   Effects on culture  
The literature on cultural differences across ethnic groups has focused on different attitudes 
towards families that are persistent across generations and that European immigrants seem to 
have carried to the New World (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2007; Giuliano, 2007). We focus 
on two variables: the fertility rate,25 and the share of adults of age 20-29 that are not 
heads of their own household or head spouses, and are related to the head of the 
household (henceforth, housing dependency).  
 
We find a negative significant effect of closeness to colonies on fertility rates, but the effect 
seems to be intermediated by the additional controls, not a direct effect of the official 
colonies (in other words, fertility rates may be lower because areas closer to colonies are 
richer). As regards housing dependency, we find significant positive effects of closeness to 
colonies on housing dependency. The effect is mitigated once we use additional controls, but 
remains strongly significant. Somewhat in line with the literature on living arrangements 
across European ethnic groups (Giuliano 2007), we find a higher point estimate of housing 
dependency associated with the municipalities close to Italian colonies than elsewhere in the 
state (but the difference is not significant). 
 
 
V.   UNBUNDLING THE COLÔNIAS 
                                                 
25 That is the total fertility rate of women over 30. 
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Recapitulating the results from the previous section, we have found that closeness to an 
official colony is associated with higher per capita income, less poverty and dependence on 
Bolsa Família transfers, better health and education outcomes, and less homicides; and less 
inequality of income and educational outcomes for areas close to German colonies. Those are 
reduced-form relationships and the point of departure of this section. 
 
The differences in outcomes between the areas near the official colonies from the others may 
be explained by a variety of factors. First, those communities may have benefited from an 
initial heads-up from the government subsidies. Second, the immigrants brought with them a 
tradition of education that was unprecedented to nineteenth century Brazil. Third, the 
egalitarian land distribution of the official colonies differed from the landholding patterns of 
other regions of Brazil and the state (for an overview of land policy in nineteenth century 
Brazil, see Dean 1971). 
 
We would like to unbundle the effects of more egalitarian distribution of land ownership and 
greater initial human capital, taking advantage of the wide dispersion we find in those 
variables within Rio Grande do Sul state in 1920 (See Figure 6).26 By that time,  the state had 
only 71 municipalities and it was necessary an approximation to include the data of the 
Census of 1920 in our database. The overlay of the 1920 and 2000 municipal boundaries 
maps provided a way to reconstruct the former based on the latter. The data on literacy and 
the land ownership by 1920’s municipalities were then ascribed to the contemporary ones.27 
Across 71 municipalities, the mean land gini is 0.62 with a standard deviation of 0.19.28 For a 
comparison, the Colombian municipalities studied in Acemoglu et al. (2008) have a mean 
land gini of 0.65 with a standard deviation of 0.10. For literacy rates of those 15 and older, 
the mean is 0.52 with a standard deviation of 0.12 and they range from 0.274 to 0.837. 
 
With the goal of uncovering the relative importance of human capital and landholding 
patterns, we identify a first-stage relationship between official colonies and land gini and 
literacy rates in 1920. We estimate the equations:  
 
                                                 
26 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) unbundled the “property rights” and “contracting” institutions by exploiting 
exogenous variation that plausibly affected each one of the types of institution separately. 
27 We have not used Minimum Comparable Areas 1920-2000 (Reis et al., 2007) because then we would have 
only 27 spatial units. These areas are comparable over time because they are an aggregation of all the 
emancipated municipalities in the period. For example, if municipalities A and B have just a portion of their 
territories assigned to a new municipal unit C, the corresponding MCA will be the union of the whole territories 
of A and B. 
28 Land ginis for municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul in 1920 range from 0.201 to 0.840 (the 25th and 75th 
percentiles are respectively 0.492 and 0.751). 
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1920 11 1
1920 21 22 2
land_  =  
 = 
gini AnyColony v
literacy AnyColony GermanColony v

 

   
 
where AnyColony is the measure of closeness to any official colony, and GermanColony is 
the measure of closeness to a German colony. The results are presented in Table 5. We find a 
strong negative relationship between land ginis and closeness to official colonies and that this 
relationship is not conditional on the national origin of the settlers (columns I-II). For literacy 
rates, the results in column III show that the areas nearby German colonies were remarkably 
different in their literacy rates than other areas. 
 
Then for the second-stage regression, we estimate the following specification, using 
AnyColony and GermanColony  as instruments for land gini and literacy rates: 
 
 1920 1 1920 2  land_  +  Y gini literacy     (2)  
 
where Y is the outcome of interest; the land gini and literacy rates were taken from the 
Census of 1920 and  is an orthogonal error term. 29  
 
We present the reduced form regressions on Table 6. We find a negative effect of 1920 land 
ginis on population density, HDI, life expectancy and school enrollment 10-14; and a 
positive effect for poverty rates, income inequality, child mortality and incidence of Bolsa 
Família families. With the exception of the school enrollment measure, a more egalitarian 
land distribution in 1920 due to proximity to colonies is for all other significant specifications 
associated with good outcomes.  
 
The results for the effect of 1920 literacy rates are statistically insignificant except a negative 
effect of literacy rates on present day fertility rates, in line with the known regularity that 
fertility rates tend to be lower for more educated societies. Somewhat surprisingly, literacy 
rates in 1920 do not seem to have caused test scores today, but the estimated coefficient at 
least have the expected sign (a higher literacy rate in 1920 being associated with higher test 
scores today). 
 
In short, areas close to official colonies had less concentrated landholdings in 1920, and this 
may have resulted in greater population density, HDI and lower poverty rates and income 
inequality today. For the health and education outcomes, past land inequality again seems to 
dominate the human capital channel, but for the education outcomes standard errors are very 
                                                 
29 Instead of using minimal comparable areas (MCA), we decided to rebuild the 1920 map of the state using the 
1997 municipal boundaries. This technique is not as rigorous as the MCA procedure. Nevertheless, it was 
necessary to use it in order to obtain a more detailed and meaningful map of the state. 
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wide and we cannot establish statistical significance. There is also a highly significant 
connection between past land inequality and the incidence of Bolsa Família transfers, but no 
connection to past literacy rates. Finally, the only contemporaneous variable that is 
significantly related to past literacy rates, conditional on past land inequality, is the fertility 
rate – the higher the literacy rate in 1920, the lower the fertility rate in 2000. 
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The study of the mechanisms behind the long-term processes that determined the 
development successes or failures of countries and regions has spurred research drawing 
lessons from history for a better understanding of the long-term forces driving economic 
development (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 2002; 
Naritomi, Soares and Assunção 2007; Nunn 2007, 2010; Banerjee and Iyer 2010).  
 
This paper draws from the historical natural experiment of government sponsored European 
immigration to the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil. We have assembled a 
unique database of official colonies in that state and matched their original sites to present-
day municipalities. We found that municipalities in that state that were close to the site of a 
government subsidized settlement of European immigrants are different in several 
dimensions from the ones that are not: closeness to an official colony is associated with 
higher per capita income, less poverty and dependence on Bolsa Família transfers, better 
health and education outcomes, less homicides; and for the areas close to German colonies, 
also less inequality of income and educational outcomes.  
 
Those differences may be explained by a variety of factors. First, those communities may 
have benefited from an initial heads-up from the government subsidies. Second, the 
immigrants may have brought with them a tradition of education that was unprecedented to 
nineteenth century Brazil. Third, the egalitarian land distribution of the official colonies 
differed from the landholding patterns of other regions of Brazil and the state.  
 
We attempt to sort out the relative importance of those different mechanisms by estimating, 
using two-stage least squares, a model relating present-day development outcomes to land 
inequality and literacy in 1920, using the measure of closeness to a colony and to a German 
colony as instruments. We find that 1920 egalitarian landholdings appear in general more 
strongly associated with good outcomes today than the 1920 literacy measure. This result 
indicates an important role for government policy (how land was distributed to immigrants) 
that is more long-lasting than the effects of the immigrants’ own human capital 
characteristics.  
 
Finally, our findings of a positive effect of egalitarian landholdinds on future economic 
performance at a first glance appear at odds with Acemoglu et al. (2008), an influential paper 
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on a Colombian setting. That paper finds that a higher concentration of landholdings in the 
past is associated with greater development, calling into question the near consensus in the 
profession that blames economic inequality for some development maladies (North 1959; 
Ferreira 1999). Nevertheless the comparison may be inappropriate due to the much wider 
range of observed land inequality in our sample if the long-run benefits from a more 
egalitarian landholding distribution accrue only when inequality is below a certain threshold. 
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Table 1. List of government sponsored (official) colonies in Rio Grande do Sul (1824-1918) 
Name of colony
Year of 
establishment
Name of current 
municipality Germans Italians Other Europeans
São Leopoldo 1824 São Leopoldo Yes
São João das Missões 1825 N/A Yes
São Pedro das Torres 1826 Torres Yes
Sao Pedro de Alcantara 1826 Torres Yes
Três Forquilhas 1826 Três Forquilhas Yes
São José do Hortêncio 1827 São José do Hortêncio Yes
Feliz 1846 Feliz Yes
Santa Cruz 1849 Santa Cruz do Sul Yes
Santo Ângelo 1857 Agudo Yes
Nova Petrópolis 1858 Nova Petrópolis Yes
Monte Alverne 1859 Santa Cruz do Sul Yes
Dona Isabel 1870 Bento Gonçalves Yes Austrian, Frenchmen
Conde D'eu 1870 Garibaldi Yes Yes Austrian, Frenchmen
São Feliciano 1874 Dom Feliciano Poles, Frenchmen
Fundos de nova Palmira 1875 Caxias do Sul Yes
Silveira Martins 1877 Silveira Martins Yes
Col. Mil. Alto Uruguai 1879 Três Passos
Municipal (Pelotas) 1882 Pelotas Yes Yes Poles
Alfredo Chaves 1884 Veranópolis Yes Yes Prussians, Poles
Antônio Prado 1885 Antônio Prado Yes Poles
Barão do Triunfo 1888 Barão do Triunfo Yes
Mariana Pimental 1888 Mariana Pimentel Yes Yes Poles
Maciel 1888 Pelotas Yes Poles
Vila Nova de Santo Antônio 1888 Santo Antonio da Patrulha Yes
Vila Nova 1888 Turuçu Yes
Jaguari 1889 Jaguari Yes Yes
São Vicente 1889 Jaguari Yes
São Xavier 1889 Porto Xavier Yes
Botucaraí 1890 Cachoeira do Sul Yes
Dona Francisca 1890 Dona Francisca Yes Yes
Ijuí 1890 Ijuí Yes Yes (*)
Ernesto Alves 1890 Santiago Yes Yes
Toroqua 1890 São Francisco de Assis Yes Yes
Toropi 1890 Toropi Yes
Marquês do Herval 1891 Maquiné Yes Yes Poles
Guarani 1891 Guarani das Missões Yes Yes Poles
Cerro Pelado 1891 Porto Xavier Yes Yes Russians, Poles
Cascata 1892 N/A
Guaporé 1892 Guaporé Yes Yes Poles, Russians, Austrians
São Marcos 1892 São Marcos Yes Poles
Cerro Cadeado 1895 Augusto Pestana Yes
Chimarrão 1897 N/A
Anta Gorda 1898 Anta Gorda Yes Yes
Itapuca 1900 Itapuca Yes Austrians
Sobradinho 1901 Sobradinho Yes Yes
Erechim 1908 Getúlio Vargas Yes Yes Russians
São Bráz 1909 Chuvisca Yes Poles
Pontão do Ijuizinho 1910 Jóia Yes Yes
São João Batista 1912 Santo Ângelo Yes
Santa Rosa 1915 Santa Rosa Yes Yes Poles
Guarita 1917 Sarandi Yes Yes
Forquilha 1918 Lagoa Vermelha Yes Yes Poles
(*) Poles, Latvians, Austrians, Dutchmen, Swedes, Spaniards, Lebaneses, Arabs, Lithuanians, Rutenians, Czechs, Finns and Greeks  
Source: Mulhall (1873), Amstad (1999), Roche (1954, 1969), Korndörfer (2009) and our own annotations. 
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Table 2- Population of Rio Grande do Sul per nationality in selected years. 
 
 Rio Grande do Sul Brazil 
Year Total Foreigners % 
Foreigners 
Total Foreigners %
Foreigners 
1872 434813 41725 9.60% 9930478 388459 3.76%
1890 897455 34765 3.87% 14333915 351545 2.39%
1900 1149070 135099 11.76% 17438434 1074511 5.80%
1920 2182713 151025 6.92% 30635605 1565961 4.86%
1950 4164821 78138 1.88% 51944397 1214184 2.28%
1970 6755458 51079 0.76% 94508583 1229128 1.28%
2000 10181749 26348 0.26% 169590693 510067 0.30%
Growth  
1872-1920 3.4% 2.7% 2.4% 2.9% 
Growth  
1872-2000 2.5% -0.4% 2.2% 0.2% 
 
Source: Levy (1974) for 1872-1970; IBGE (2010, Banco de Dados Agregado – SIDRA. 
http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/) for 2000 figures. There is a small discrepancy between Levy (1974) 
and IBGE numbers for the previous years. 
 
  
Table 3 – Distribution of municipalities with official settlements according to the regions 
of Rio Grande do Sul and year of settlement.  
 
 Campanha Planalto Serra Heterogeneous 
Year of 
settlement  
<= 1840 0 0 2 2
1841 - 1870 0 0 5 1
  1871 - 1889 2 2 4 4
  1890 - 1900 1 6 1 5
  1901+ 0 6 1 1
Note: The “Heterogeneous” region refers to municipalities that do not fit clearly in the 
previous regions because they are peculiar and/or are located in transition areas between 
regions. The difference between the total number of municipalities and official settlements 
occurs because there were municipalities that had more than one “colônia”. 
.
  
Table 4. OLS Reduced Form Regression Results 
(2)
Closeness to 
colony  
Closeness to 
colony  
Name Mean / S.D. Coeff. [S.E.] R
2
Coeff. [S.E.] German Italian Other
1 % Catholic 0.818 [0.146] 0 [0.0242] 0.24 -0.003 [0.0248] -0.105 [0.0402] 0.183 [0.0478] -0.064 [0.037] 0.00 0.45
2 % Mainline Protestant 0.092 [0.132] 0.044 [0.0233] 0.15 0.055 [0.0241] 0.156 [0.0388] -0.172 [0.0461] 0.041 [0.0357] 0.00 0.03
3 % Atheist 0.018 [0.036] -0.014 [0.0046] 0.54 -0.019 [0.0045] -0.025 [0.0077] 0.005 [0.0092] 0.01 [0.0071] 0.06 0.00
4 Population density, in logs 3.377 [1.09] 0.637 [0.1461] 0.49 N/A 0.725 [0.2473] -0.369 [0.294] 0.197 [0.2274] 0.03 0.11
5 HDI 2000 0.785 [0.035] 0.025 [0.006] 0.20 0.005 [0.0028] 0.002 [0.0099] 0.01 [0.0118] 0.029 [0.0091] 0.67 0.05
6 Per capita income, in logs 5.478 [0.308] 0.192 [0.0491] 0.29 N/A -0.007 [0.0809] 0.077 [0.0962] 0.259 [0.0744] 0.61 0.02
7 % Poor 25.728 [12.812] -9.017 [1.8378] 0.44 -3.434 [0.9862] -2.97 [3.0403] -1.196 [3.6142] -9.618 [2.796] 0.77 0.11
8 Gini 0.523 [0.057] -0.032 [0.0084] 0.41 -0.04 [0.0082] -0.028 [0.0142] 0.006 [0.0169] -0.006 [0.0131] 0.24 0.25
9 Child mortality under 5 16.623 [5.303] -2.216 [0.9258] 0.17 -1.093 [0.8548] 0.687 [1.5562] -2.678 [1.85] -0.869 [1.4312] 0.28 0.46
10 Life expectancy 72.507 [2.502] 1.055 [0.4353] 0.17 0.559 [0.4023] -0.198 [0.7325] 1.171 [0.8707] 0.31 [0.6736] 0.35 0.61
11 Physicians/'000 people 0.421 [0.606] 0.422 [0.1023] 0.06 0.207 [0.09] 0.371 [0.1719] -0.195 [0.2044] 0.35 [0.1581] 0.10 0.93
12 % Nurses with higher degree 15.238 [14.324] -0.467 [2.6274] 0.07 -0.918 [2.6844] 3.189 [4.4277] -0.583 [5.2635] -2.625 [4.072] 0.67 0.33
13 Illiteracy 9.063 [4.109] -3.239 [0.7044] 0.19 -1.295 [0.5032] -3.311 [1.1688] 1.277 [1.3894] -2.818 [1.0749] 0.05 0.76
14 Mean Score ENEM -0.035 [0.076] 0.057 [0.0128] 0.23 0.036 [0.0117] 0.083 [0.0213] -0.018 [0.0254] -0.007 [0.0197] 0.02 0.00
15 SD Score ENEM 0.264 [0.037] -0.01 [0.0068] 0.08 -0.01 [0.007] -0.039 [0.0113] 0.005 [0.0134] 0.03 [0.0104] 0.06 0.00
16 % Enrollment 10-14 0.971 [0.026] 0.009 [0.0046] 0.12 0.004 [0.0045] -0.012 [0.0077] 0.024 [0.0092] 0 [0.0071] 0.02 0.24
17 % Enroll 7-17, private 0.043 [0.047] 0.022 [0.0084] 0.09 0 [0.0061] 0.006 [0.0139] -0.018 [0.0166] 0.054 [0.0128] 0.41 0.01
18 # Bolsa Familia/Pop 0.147 [0.074] -0.05 [0.0104] 0.46 -0.024 [0.0077] -0.024 [0.0176] -0.014 [0.0209] -0.019 [0.0162] 0.77 0.83
19 Homicide rate 2.944 [1.744] -0.357 [0.3143] 0.11 -0.507 [0.2896] -0.932 [0.5278] 0.175 [0.6274] 0.749 [0.4854] 0.30 0.02
20 Education Exp, per capita 6.246 [0.384] 0.015 [0.0672] 0.16 0.049 [0.0554] 0.034 [0.1126] 0.15 [0.1338] -0.259 [0.1035] 0.61 0.05
21 % Mun. Exp. In education 0.288 [0.046] -0.003 [0.0077] 0.23 0.006 [0.0077] -0.021 [0.013] 0.023 [0.0154] -0.011 [0.0119] 0.10 0.57
22 % Mun. Exp. In overhead 0.231 [0.079] -0.012 [0.0144] 0.09 -0.004 [0.0145] -0.015 [0.0243] -0.01 [0.0289] 0.025 [0.0224] 0.91 0.21
23 Fertility rate 3.296 [0.481] -0.28 [0.0762] 0.31 -0.098 [0.06] -0.129 [0.1272] -0.129 [0.1512] -0.165 [0.1169] 1.00 0.83
24 % Living with relatives, 20-29 0.494 [0.094] 0.059 [0.0155] 0.25 0.045 [0.0147] 0.015 [0.0259] 0.059 [0.0308] 0.005 [0.0239] 0.41 0.76
Exogenous controls Yes Yes
Additional controls? No Yes
Culture
Yes
No
Religion
Macroeco
nomics
Health
Education
Social
Fiscal
(1) (3)
Dependent variable Closeness to colony
P-value 
Italian 
vs 
German
P-value 
Others 
vs 
German
 
Note: All the regressions have 494 observations and are unweighted. Exogenous controls include functions of temperature (max, range), soil quality, altitude, 
rain patterns and distance to the capital for each municipality. Additional controls include per capita income, population and population density. 
  
Table 5. Reduced Form Estimates of the Effects of Official Colonies on Land Inequality and 
Literacy Ratio in 1920 
I II III
Gini 1920 Gini 1920 Literacy 1920
Closeness to:
Any Colony -0.00512 -.171** -.175**
German Colony -0.178 .32***
Number of Observations 495 495 495
R-squared 0.0567 0.0491 0.113
F-stat 2.97 6.1 4.03  
Note: Regressions have 495 observations and are weighted by population in 2000 and standard errors are 
clustered by 1920 municipality (71 clusters).  
  
Table 6. IV Estimates of the Long-Run Effects of Land Inequality and Literacy Ratio in 1920. 
 
(1) (2)
Gini 1920  Literacy 1920
Name Mean / S.D. Coeff. [S.E.] Coeff. [S.E.]
4 Population density, in logs 3.377 [1.09] -11.442 [5.6354] * -5.293 [6.5511] 
5 HDI 2000 0.785 [0.035] -0.254 [0.12] * -0.05 [0.1056] 
6 Per capita income, in logs 5.478 [0.308] -1.27 [0.7936] 0.422 [0.8241] 
7 % Poor 25.728 [12.812] 85.698 [41.5435] * -6.682 [41.5434] 
8 Income gini 2000 0.523 [0.057] 0.592 [0.3235] * 0.262 [0.3337] 
9 Child mortality under 5 16.623 [5.303] 35.939 [18.3821] * 13.565 [17.3414] 
10 Life expectancy 72.507 [2.502] -17.73 [9.0458] * -7.2 [8.5354] 
11 Physicians/'000 people 0.421 [0.606] -2.306 [1.7031] -0.742 [1.5207] 
12 % Nurses with higher degree 15.238 [14.324] 50.877 [61.3444] 58.048 [55.2124] 
13 Illiteracy 9.063 [4.109] 24.43 [16.0097] -3.548 [16.8765] 
14 Mean Score ENEM -0.035 [0.076] -0.315 [0.2537] 0.225 [0.2603] 
15 SD Score ENEM 0.264 [0.037] -0.045 [0.126] -0.217 [0.1592] 
16 % Enrollment 10-14 0.971 [0.026] -0.148 [0.0858] * -0.129 [0.0809] 
17 % Enroll 7-17, private 0.043 [0.047] -0.254 [0.1652] -0.108 [0.1553] 
18 # Bolsa Familia/Pop 0.147 [0.074] 0.671 [0.3038] * 0.197 [0.3177] 
19 Homicide rate 2.944 [1.744] 3.594 [5.242] 2.02 [5.2531] 
20 Education Exp, per capita 6.246 [0.384] -0.303 [1.0644] 0.048 [1.0082] 
21 % Mun. Exp. In education 0.288 [0.046] 0.065 [0.1154] 0.076 [0.1036] 
22 % Mun. Exp. In overhead 0.231 [0.079] 0.184 [0.2451] 0.247 [0.2395] 
23 Fertility rate 3.296 [0.481] -0.358 [0.9636] -3.039 [0.7236] *
24 % Living with relatives, 20-29 0.494 [0.094] -0.363 [0.3235] -0.135 [0.3288] 
Mean 0.6249 0.519
Standard Deviation 0.193 0.121
Min - Max 0.201-0.840 0.274-0.837
RHS 
variables
Dependent variable
Culture
Macroeco
nomics
Health
Education
Social
Fiscal
 
Note: Regressions have 494 observations and are weighted by population in 2000 and standard errors are 
clustered by 1920 municipality (71 clusters). They were estimated by two-stage least squares using measures 
of closeness to any colony and closeness to German colonies are instruments for the land gini and literacy 
rates in 1920. 
The homicide rate is transformed by f(x) = ln(1+x) to deal with zeros.  
 
  
Data Appendix 
Variables Description 
Rain (mm per month) Trimester averages of rain, in millimeters per month (December 
to February; March to May; June to August; September to 
November) over a 30 year period (1961-1990). These estimates 
were built based on the database CRU CL 2.0 10' of the Climate 
Research Unit at University of East Anglia (CRU-UEA) in the UK 
(New et al. 2002 and http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk). Downloaded 
from www.ipeadata.gov.br 
Temperature (°C) Trimester averages of temperature, in Celsius, per month 
(December to February; March to May; June to August; 
September to November) over a 30 year period (1961-1990). 
These estimates were built based on the database CRU CL 2.0 10' 
of the Climate Research Unit at University of East Anglia (CRU-
UEA) in the UK (New et al. 2002 and http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk). 
Downloaded from www.ipeadata.gov.br 
Quality of soil “Quality of Soil” is an ordered categorical variable made up of 
information of on topography, soil fertility, and physical 
constraints to agriculture (such as risk of floods, or occurrence of 
rocks or sand). It has been built through the overlapping of a 
map of quality of soil (IBGE, 2010b) and the grid of current 
municipalities. The shares of each ten types of soil in each 
municipality were then calculated using GIS tools.  We thank 
Vanessa Nadalin (IPEA) for her help on this task. 
Religion 
% Catholic 
% Mainline Protestant 
% Atheist 
Calculated by the authors based on the Census of 2000. The 
percentages are calculated among the adult (older than 18) 
population. Catholic refers to codes 110-199; mainline 
protestant to codes 210-289 and atheist to codes 0 for the 
religion variable. 
Macroeconomics 
Population density, in logs Calculated by the authors, based on population and area data 
from IPEADATA. 
Human Development Index (HDI 
2000) 
The HDI is the arithmetic average of three sub-indices, referring 
to longevity (HDI Longevity), education (HDI Education) and 
Income (HDI Income). To obtain more methodological 
informations about this índex, access www.undp.org.br . 
Per capita income, in logs That is the log of the average per capita household income in a 
municipality, monthly and measured in Reais of August 1st, 2000. 
% Poor Percent of persons with household per capita income below 
R$75.50, which is equivalent to ½ minimum wage in August 
2000. The universe of individuals is limited to those living in 
permanent households. Source: IPEADATA. To obtain more 
methodological information, access www.undp.org.br  
  
Gini Source: IPEADATA
Health 
Child mortality under 5 Frequency of mortality before 5 years of age, per 1000 live 
births.  Source: IPEADATA 
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth, assuming constant mortality rates in 
future years.  Primary source: Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano 
no Brasil 2000. Source: IPEADATA 
Number of physicians per 1000 
inhabitants 
 
Ratio between the number of physicians residing in a 
municipality and its total population, including resident 
physicians, times 1000. Source:  www.undp.org.br 
Proportion of nurses with a higher 
degree (%) 
Proportion of nurses with a higher degree working as nurses in 
the municipality. Source: www.undp.org.br 
Education 
Illiteracy Percent of illiterate persons within the population over 15 years 
old that cannot read. Source: IPEADATA 
ENEM Scores (mean, standard 
deviation) 
ENEM is a nationwide exam for concluding high schoolers with a 
very high take-up rate. To construct mean scores, we run a 
regression of individual Z-scores on interactions of age, gender 
and latest degree concluded; save the residuals; and aggregate 
them by municipality or minimal comparable area. 
% Enrollment 10-14 Calculated by the authors based on the Census of 2000. The 
percentages are calculated for children ages 10-14, enrollment is 
denoted by codes 1-2 in the variable V0429. 
% Enrollment 7-17, private school Calculated by the authors based on the Census of 2000. The 
percentages are calculated for children ages 10-14, enrollment is 
denoted by code 1 in the variable V0429 
Social 
Bolsa Família program- number of 
families receiving benefits in 
December 
Number of families receiving Bolsa Família benefits in December, 
downloaded from www.ipeadata.gov.br 
Number of homicides per capita Original data comes from SIM-DATASUS (see 
http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/deftohtm.exe?sim/cnv/obtbr.d
ef and http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/sim/obtdescr.htm), but 
we downloaded the data from www.ipeadata.gov.br  
The homicide rate is calculated based on the average yearly 
homicide count in 1998-2002 for each minimal comparable area, 
divided by the population of the minimal comparable area in 
2000.  
Since we take logs, we deal with the zeros by adding 1 to the 
homicide rate before taking logs. 
  
Fiscal 
Municipal education Expenditure, 
per capita 
% Municipal Expenditure in 
Education 
% Municipal Expenditure in 
Overhead 
Source: IPEADATA
Culture 
Fertility rate Source: IPEADATA
% Living with relatives, 20-29 Calculated by the authors, from the micro data from Census of 
2000, 
  
Figure 1. Rio Grande do Sul and Brazil 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Regions of Rio Grande do Sul 
 
 
 
Source: Fonseca (2003, p. 28) 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Creation of Official Settlements by decade (Rio Grande do Sul 1820-1920) 
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Figure 4 
 
  
Figure 5. Closeness to Official Colonies 
 
  
Figure 6  
I. Rio Grande do Sul: 1920 Municipalities with an Official Colony 
 
 
II. Rio Grande do Sul: Land Gini 1920 III. Rio Grande do Sul: Literacy Ratio, 15 and Older in 1920 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
